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United States Accounting Standards: Do the SEC
Requirements regarding U.S. GAAP Violate GATS?
Introduction
Trade is an important part of the world economy. Multilateral
trade agreements have been established to facilitate free trade.'
Tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade are generally not allowed
between contracting parties.2 However, "[t]he real question is not
the actual existence of the barrier, but the willingness to dismantle
it, which is affected by the degree to which the barrier is
embedded in the non-trade public policy or economic system of
the country raising the barrier."3  In the United States, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all
companies wishing to register with them to provide financial
statements that use U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (U.S. GAAP) or to reconcile any differences in the
accounting standards used with U.S. GAAP.4  Does this
requirement constitute a non-tariff barrier to trade in the stock
market? To answer this question, this article will look at the
background trade agreements including the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)5 and the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS).6 After looking at these trade agreements, this
article will look at the SEC requirements regarding accounting
See infra notes 9-59 and accompanying text.
2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 13, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 187, http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf at 1
[hereinafter GATT].
3 Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services Under GATS, NAFTA, and the
EC: A Regulatory JurisdictionalAnalysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 45 (1995).
4 Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign Private Issuers, Securities Act Release
No. 6360, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,054, at 84,648
(Nov. 20, 1981).
5 GATT, supra note 2.
6 The General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex lB, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/26-
gats.pdf [hereinafter GATS]; see infra notes 9-59 and accompanying text.
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standards for foreign issuers.7 Finally this article will examine
whether the SEC rules constitute a non-tariff trade barrier and the
effect the rules have on foreign issuers.8
I. Trade Agreements
In order to further international trade goals, several countries
have participated in a series of negotiating rounds and established
a multilateral trade system. The first set of negotiations resulted in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which took
effect on January 1, 1948.' The primary goal of the GATT is to
reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and to "open
markets".' °  The GATT anticipated the establishment of the
International Trade Organization to oversee the implementation of
the agreements." The establishment of this organization required
the ratification of the Havana Charter by the contracting
countries.' The U.S. Congress did not approve the Charter and,
thus, the contracting countries were forced to "cobbl[e] together an
institutional structure to govern the multilateral trade system for
nearly a half century."' 3 This lack of a central governing body was
one of the many concerns addressed at the Uruguay Round.' 4 The
Uruguay Round of negotiations started on September 20, 1986 and
7 See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 66-101 and accompanying text.
9 GATT, supra note 2. For a historical overview of the GATT system see
generally Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 421
(1998).
10 Kennedy, supra note 9, at 421.
I I David W. Leebron, An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 12 (1995).
12 Id. The contracting countries are:
the Commonwealth of Australia, the Kingdom of Belgium, the United States of
Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of China,
the Republic of Cuba, the Czechoslovak Republic, the French Republic, India,
Lebanon, the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, the
Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the United States of America.
GATT, supra note 2.
13 Leebron, supra note 11, at 13.
14 Id. at 12.
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lasted over seven years. 5 The Final Act of the Uruguay Round,
signed on April 15, 1994,16 included an agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization (WTO). 7
The original GATT applied only to trade in goods. 8 In 1947,
when the GATT was first signed, trade in services "were not a
significant component of world trade."' 9 In addition, "[s]ervices in
general, and heavily regulated services like financial services in
particular, are not completely amenable to some of the traditional
trade disciplines found in GATT, such as reduction of tariffs,
prohibition of quantitative restrictions, most favored nation
treatment, and national treatment. 2 °  However, the world
economic landscape changed significantly in the years following
the enactment of GATT. The issue of trade in services became an
important issue for the United States in the 1970s.2 Congress
enacted legislation 22 addressing trade and included trade in goods
and services in its definition of "international trade., 23 "The
service sector of the United States'[s] economy encompasses 'all
economic activity other than agriculture, mining, and
manufacturing."' It is the largest component of the United
States'[s] economy, accounting for approximately 80% of the
United States'[s] gross domestic product and private non-farm
employment. Services were first officially considered an
international trade issue when trade in services was added to the
table in the Uruguay negotiation rounds through the Punta del Este
Ministerial Declaration. 25  The Declaration indicated that GATT
15 J. Steven Jarreau, Interpreting the General Agreement on Trade in Services and
the WTO Instruments Relevant to the International Trade of Financial Services: The
Lawyer's Perspective, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 20 (1999).
16 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 51. The agreement went into effect on Jan. 1, 1995.
Jarreau, supra note 15, at 27.
17 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 20.
18 Id. at 12.
19 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 51 (quoting Office of the USTR, GATT Uruguay
Round: Progress Report 6 (Dec. 14, 1988)).
20 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 41.
21 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 11-12.
22 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2101 (2003).
23 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 11.
24 Id. at 7.
25 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 44.
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principles would apply to trade in services, but trade in services
would not actually be included within the legal framework of
GATT.16 One of the reasons that agreements on financial services
were not included within the framework of GATT is because of
the nature of the different agreements.
In GATT, there has been an effort to "tariffy"-convert to tariff
form-non-tariff barriers, in order to quantify them and to make
them more amenable to reduction, as well as to provide a less
economically objectionable form of trade barrier. Traditionally,
services have not been subjected to tariffs, possibly because of
their "invisible" nature: it is difficult to identify the point at
which they cross a border. Even where the service is easily
identified, it is normally not subject to tariff.27
At least for the United States, the primary goal of establishing
this multilateral system for dealing with trade in services was to
set up a more rigorous approach to national barriers to trade in the
service sector.2' The negotiations ended with inclusion of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as part of the
Final Act of the Uruguay Round.29 There are eight annexes, in
addition to the main text of GATS, that are considered integral
parts of the agreement.3" While not officially part of the text of
GATS, the annexes are essentially additional agreements reached
by the parties.3 "Trade in services includes cross-border services,
services provided in one country to consumers from another
country, services provided by an establishment of a person from
one country in another country, or services provided by natural
persons from one country in the territory of another country. 3
2
Included under the broad umbrella of services is the subsection of
financial services.33 Financial services is a broad category that
contains insurance, securities, and banking services.34
26 Id.
27 Id. at 45.
28 Id. at 52.
29 Id. at 44.
30 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 34.
31 Id.
32 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 44.
33 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 6.
34 Id. at 8.
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GATS is the first multilateral agreement providing disciplines
on barriers to trade and investment in the services sector. GATS
provides a limited scope of discipline, addressing geographic
regulatory restrictions (those that are more explicitly
protectionist), but avoiding immediate action on the far more
difficult problem of generally applicable regulation that has
collateral restrictive effects on trade in services. 35
Getting an agreement on financial services proved to be a
difficult task.36 During the Uruguay Round, the negotiations
regarding financial services ended in a deadlock between the
United States and the European Union (E.U.).37 "[T]he [United
States] severely limited the application of GATS to financial
services, as GATS had not achieved sufficient market
liberalization in other countries for the [United States] to be
willing to lock in its own liberal policies regarding national
treatment."38 The United States's main concern was the lack of
sufficient market-opening commitments in the areas of banking
and securities that were guaranteed by many of the contracting
parties.39 Time was important in the negotiation process because
the U.S. Congress gave authorization to enter into the Uruguay
Round agreement under fast track procedures." The importance of
the fast track procedures is that the agreement would be accepted
in its entirety, without Congress having the opportunity to make
changes to the agreement. If an agreement could not be reached
on the financial services issue before the December 15, 1993
deadline, Congress would have been able to amend the agreements
reached during the negotiations.41 Allowing the U.S. Congress to
amend the agreements would have guaranteed the demise of
35 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 56.
36 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 10.
37 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 25.
38 id. at 54.
39 Id. Those countries that attempt to benefit from the market liberalization granted
by other nations without granting increase access to their markets are known as "free
riders." Id.
40 Id. For a discussion of the "fast track" procedure see David A. Gantz, A Post-
Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 22 (1995).
41 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 25.
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GATS.42  In order to save the negotiated agreements, the
contracting countries decided to extend the negotiation period for
financial services in the Decision on Financial Services.43
Following the Uruguay Round the negotiations on financial
services continued. The Decision on Financial Services
authorized negotiations to last until June 30, 1995. 44 As the
negotiations continued, "it became apparent that the United States
would not sign a broad financial services agreement., 45 On June
30, 1995, the United States indicated that it would no longer
participate in the negotiations 6.4  The negotiations were extended
for one month and an "interim" agreement was reached without
the participation of the United States.47  Seventy-seven WTO
members made financial services commitments in this
agreement.48
In December 1996, the WTO decided it would resume
negotiations on financial services in April 1997. The agreement to
resume the negotiations was made in the Singapore Ministerial
Declaration. 49 The participating countries hoped to attain better
market access commitments with more countries allowing this
improved access.50 The result of these negotiations was the Fifth
Protocol to the GATS, known as the Financial Services
Agreement.5 1 The Financial Services Agreement was signed on
December 13, 1997 by 102 WTO members.5 2  The Financial
Services Agreement became effective on March 1, 1999. 5' The
agreements reached are subject to the schedules of commitments
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 27.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997).
50 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 27.
51 Fifth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (Dec. 3, 1997),
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/5prote_sl45e.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation).
52 Id.
53 Id.
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and exemptions enacted by each country.54 "Each WTO Member's
Schedule of Specific Commitments and List of Article II
Exemptions, if any, are unique. The current and effective
Schedule and List of each Member must be read carefully to
determine precisely those opportunities afforded to foreign
services and service suppliers."55
The agreements have provisions providing for most-favored-
nation treatment,56 transparency,57 market access,58 and national
treatment. 59
II. Accounting Standards
The SEC regulates the disclosures required of public
companies under the Securities Act of 1933.60 "The federal
securities laws apply to issuers who offer, sell[,] or trade securities
between the United States and any foreign country., 61 In order to
trade in the United States, companies generally must register with
the SEC.62 Foreign companies wishing to register and trade stocks
in the United States securities market must use U.S. GAAP in their
financial statements or must reconcile their financial statements to
U.S. GAAP.63 Proponents of this requirement argue that this is
necessary to protect U.S. investors and the U.S. economy.64
Proponents of the accounting standards also justify the
54 These schedules are integral parts of the agreements and consist of over 30,000
pages. WTO Legal Texts, Countries' Schedules of Commitments, http://www.wto.org/
english/docs e/legal e/legal e.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation).
55 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 42.
56 See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
58 See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
60 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1999).
61 Roberta S. Karmel, Will Convergence of Financial Disclosure Standards
Change SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers?, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 485, 489 (2000).
62 Id.
63 Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign Private Issuers, Securities Release No.
6360, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,054 at 84,648 (Nov.
20, 1981).
64 Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony or Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements
in the International Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAW. 413, 429 (1995).
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requirement because:
[A] distinction is made between foreign issuers that voluntarily
enter the United States securities markets and those companies
whose securities are traded in the United States without any
significant voluntary acts of encouragement by the issuer.
Currently, this distinction is accomplished by deeming all
foreign companies having either securities listed on a United
States exchange or having made a public offering of securities
registered under the Securities Act as having voluntarily entered
the United States market. Other foreign companies whose
securities are traded in the United States through no direct acts
of the issuers are deemed not to have taken any voluntary acts to
enter the United States market.65
III. Discussion
The issue to consider is whether the requirement that foreign
investors use U.S. GAAP in their disclosure statements violates
GATS and the Financial Services Agreement. There are several
factors to consider in determining whether a particular regulation
constitutes a non-tariff barrier to trade. These include most-
favored-nation treatment, transparency, market access, and
national treatment.
The most-favored-nation (MFN) provisions require that "each
Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services
and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less
favourable than that it accords to like services and service
suppliers of any other country., 66 MFN treatment was a highly
65 Id. at 425-26 (citing Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign Private Issuers,
Securities Act Release No. 6360 at 84,645).
66 GATS, supra note 6, art. 1I para. 1.
The MFN issues are three-fold, subsequent to a review of the
Member's Article 1I exemptions. The issues are: (1) is the Member
at issue extending any treatment of the service in question to the
services or service suppliers of any other country?; (2) is the service
or service supplier at issue like the service or service supplier that
has been accorded treatment of any nature by the desired host
Member?; and (3) are the services or service suppliers of any other
country, whether a WTO Member or not, accorded more favorable
treatment?
Jarreau, supra note 15, at 62.
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debated issue during the rounds of negotiations.67 Countries,
particularly the United States, were concerned about granting
MFN treatment when other countries would not do so.68 Each
country's MFN treatment obligation is subject to the country's
Annex on Article II Exemptions.6 9 The Article II Exemptions are
viewed as an integral part of GATS, and allow a country to
"maintain measures that are inconsistent with the obligation to
accord immediate and unconditional treatment that is 'no less
favourable' to the services and service suppliers of other Members
than the treatment extended to the services and service suppliers of
any other country."7  These exemptions allow the contracting
members to have greater flexibility and protection to withhold
commitments to other countries that do not allow access to their
markets.7"
The SEC rules require all companies wishing to register with it
to either use U.S. GAAP or, in certain circumstances, reconcile
different treatment with U.S. GAAP.72 Because the requirement is
uniformly applied, it appears that the SEC's rules regarding U.S.
GAAP met the requirements of MFN treatment.
In addition to MFN treatment, countries must meet the
transparency requirements. 3 The transparency provision provides
that "[e]ach Member shall publish promptly and, except in
emergency situations, at the latest by the time of their entry into
force, all relevant measures of general application which pertain to
or affect the operation of this Agreement."74 This provision is
important to provide notice to the contracting countries about
requirements that might affect trade in services. It is important to
note that the Agreement does not provide where the requirements
67 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 54.
68 Id.
69 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 35.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Perry E. Wallace, The Globalization of Corporate Governance: Shareholder
Protection, Hostile Takeovers and Evolving Corporate Environment in France, 18
CONN. J. INT'L L. 1,39 (2002).
73 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 63.
74 GATS, supra note 6, art. III para. 1.
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must be published or how long they must be published.v5 The SEC
publishes the requirements for registering and listing in U.S. stock
exchanges.76 Thus, it appears that the requirement of transparency
is met.
Another important requirement of the GATS agreement is
allowing market access to contracting countries.77 This provision
requires that contracting countries afford companies from other
contracting countries MFN treatment with respect to market
access.78 What constitutes MFN treatment for market access is not
entirely clear:
"Market access" is more relative and flexible than "national
treatment," and modem requirements for market access are 6ften
found in conjunction with requirements for national
treatment... market access requirements may go further and
require a degree of harmonization downward, or negative
harmonization, sufficient to allow foreigners access. In this
way, a requirement for market access may constitute a
requirement for better-than-national treatment.79
In order for a company to fully participate in securities
markets, it may be necessary for that company to be afforded
membership on the stock exchanges. 80 Because access to the
securities market is required under GATS, it is important to look at
how accessible the exchange markets are to foreign issuers. Many
commentators suggest that the SEC requirement regarding U.S.
GAAP is the main reason that foreign companies choose not to
enter the U.S. securities markets.8 1 Because of the deterrent effect
that the SEC rules have on foreign companies, it is arguable that
75 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 63.
76 See e.g., 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m (2003) (providing that "Each financial report that
contains financial statements, and that is required to be prepared in accordance with (or
reconciled to) generally accepted accounting principles under this title and filed with the
Commission shall reflect all material correcting adjustments that have been identified by
a registered public accounting firm in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles and the rules and regulations of the Commission.").
77 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 75.
78 GATS, supra note 6, art. XVI para. 1.
79 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 76.
80 Id. at 50.
81 See Roberta S. Karmel & Mary S. Head, Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry into
U.S. Markets, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 1207, 1208-10 (1993).
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the requirements violate the market access requirement of GATS.
Perhaps the most relevant requirement for this discussion is the
requirement of national treatment. The national treatment
provision requires:
In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any
conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall
accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in
respect of all measures affecting the supply of services,
treatment no less favourable than that it accords its own like
services and service suppliers.82
To satisfy this requirement, the Member nation may adopt
"either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment
than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers."83 If
the treatment, either formally identical or formally different, that is
afforded to contracting countries makes the market more favorable
to the home country, then that treatment will violate the national
treatment requirement.84 Like other provisions of the Agreement,
this provision applies only to those sectors to which a country has
scheduled it to apply.85 It is not clear how much is required of a
home country to satisfy the national treatment requirement. It is
clear that a country can have some protective measures to ensure
the welfare of its economy. This right is provided for in one of the
eight annexes to GATS, the Annex on Financial Services, which
"authorizes each WTO Member to establish 'prudential'
regulatory measures to protect purchasers and beneficiaries of
financial services, as well as its domestic financial system." 6
While countries have the right to take some measures to protect
their interests, that right is not absolute:
"[N]ational treatment" clearly prohibits blatant protectionism or
geographic regulation, such as prohibitions or restrictions on
entry by foreigners, or more stringent rules applicable to foreign
persons than to local persons. On the other hand, it is possible
82 GATS, supra note 6, art. XVII para. 1.
83 Id. art. XVII para. 2.
84 Id. art. XVII para. 3.
85 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 68.
86 Jarreau, supra note 15, at 36. See Annex on Financial Services (July 1986),
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/26-gats.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation).
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that differential treatment may be justified from a regulatory
standpoint, as opposed to a protectionist standpoint, simply
because of the foreignness of the person regulated.8 7
In some situations, simple national treatment may not be
sufficient. "Better-than-national treatment may be necessary to
allow free trade where the application of domestic regulation
would inappropriately deter or prohibit foreign entry or
operations. '  In addition, "better-than-national treatment might
be appropriate in order to take account of differences in foreign
economic and business systems, and foreign regulation that
permits differing business structures and practices."89
To satisfy the national treatment requirement the treatment
need not be identical on its face, but it must be functionally
equivalent. In fact, treatment that is identical on its face may not
be functionally equivalent and may then violate the national
treatment requirement. The accounting standards requirement
creates a situation which gives rise to this distinction. Requiring
that all companies, whether foreign or domestic, use U.S. GAAP
in their financial statements or reconcile their statements to U.S.
GAAP, on its face, is identical treatment of foreign and domestic
companies. However, the effect of the requirement might create
functionally different treatment of foreign companies.
Perhaps the easiest way to address whether the SEC
requirements violate GATS is to look at the effects the
requirements have on foreign issuers. There is some dispute as to
whether the accounting standards requirements are actual
deterrents to foreign issuers listing on the U.S. stock exchanges.
Many commentators argue that the SEC's requirements put up a
significant barrier to foreign companies wishing to list securities
on the U.S. stock exchanges.9 ° In fact, this view is considered the
"accepted wisdom" in the financial field.91 Lawyers indicate that
foreign clients claim that the accounting standards requirements
are so onerous that the companies decide not to list directly in U.S.
87 Trachtman, supra note 3, at 64-65.
88 Id. at 65-66.
89 Id.
90 Karmel & Head, supra note 81, at 1208-12 10.
91 See James A. Fanto & Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign
Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing, 3 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 51,51 (1997).
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markets.92  Not all scholars are convinced that the SEC
requirement that foreign companies comply with U.S. GAAP is
the principal reason that foreign companies choose not to list in
the U.S. securities markets:
[R]esearch suggests that companies decide for or against listing
in the [United States] for many reasons. Disclosure
requirements, particularly accounting reconciliation, are only
one, and not always the most important of the various factors
that influence a company's decision. Other reasons include a
specific U.S. business purpose for the listing (e.g., U.S.
acquisition), the benefits of U.S. capital markets (e.g., their
liquidity and "cheapness" or their ability to supply large
amounts of equity capital), and industry-specific reasons (e.g.,
companies in a similar industry all list in the [United States]).93
Commentators are also equally divided as to whether the SEC
requirements should remain in place. There are many arguments
in favor of maintaining the U.S. GAAP requirements. One
argument is that the SEC requirements make the U.S. system
better than other systems and represents the "the most 'transparent
financial reporting and full and complete disclosure' system in the
world, and this system should be followed whenever the U.S.
public is given the opportunity to buy securities in a primary
offering or in an organized secondary trading market."94 Others
argue that for investors to make informed decisions, they must be
able to compare domestic and foreign companies and that the most
effective way of comparing the companies is to have the financial
statements use a uniform system of accounting standards.95 This
argument is supported by the first argument that U.S. GAAP
represents the best system of accounting and, thus, should be the
uniform system used. The last argument in favor of requiring
foreign companies to use U.S. GAAP is that this requirement
keeps domestic issuers from being disadvantaged in U.S. capital
markets.96
Some commentators disagree with the SEC requirements and
92 Id.
93 Id. at 52.
94 Greene, supra note 64, at 429-30.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 430.
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argue that foreign issuers should not be required to use U.S.
GAAP:
First, U.S. investors are needlessly disadvantaged under the
current system in circumstances when the information about
non-U.S. companies would be adequate for informed investment
decision-making without requiring those companies to comply
with U.S. GAAP and the other U.S. disclosure requirements.
For such companies, U.S. investors, both retail and institutional,
are merely driven to the less efficient and less transparent over-
the-counter markets and non-U.S. markets. At the same time,
U.S. retail investors who are not substantial or sophisticated
enough to make arrangements to buy securities offshore are
denied the benefits of attractively priced foreign privatizations
and other primary offerings.97
In addition, the accounting standards that a particular country,
including the United States, chooses to adopt is the result of a
political process and, thus, might not represent the best principles
for assessing financial information.98 Also, doing away with the
accounting standards requirements will not harm investors.99
There is a growing consensus among experts that requiring
foreign companies to file additional U.S. GAAP reconciliation
after their home country documents are made public is of little
value to investors. These filings have no material impact on the
price of the stock, which is set by economic fundamentals in the
home country. Even when foreign companies go through the
work to reconcile with U.S. GAAP, U.S. investment analysts
following the company typically rely more on financial
statements based on home country accounting. If the stock is
being priced in its home country using its own financials and it's
being priced here in the United States using home country
financials, what have we accomplished by forcing the company
through this particular kabuki? 00
The only thing that is clear in this debate is that there is not a
clear consensus. There is evidence that the requirement that
foreign issuers reconcile their financial statements to U.S. GAAP
97 Id. at 430-31.
98 Id. at 431.
99 James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms
Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S58, S61 (1994).
100 Id. at S62.
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does affect their ability to have the same access to U.S. securities
markets as U.S. issuers. This evidence suggests that the
requirements could violate the GATS requirements of national
treatment and market access. However, there is also evidence that
the SEC requirements do not present a significant barrier to
foreign companies. Also, the United States does have some
flexibility in making regulations that protect the U.S. economy.
Based on this evidence, the SEC requirements may not violate
GATS.
Conclusion
It has been recognized that "[t]he GATS and the Fifth Protocol
[the Financial Services Agreement] ... constitute more of a
beginning than an end of a process.' '. ° It is unclear whether the
SEC requirement that foreign companies use U.S. GAAP
accounting standards constitutes a violation of multilateral trade
agreements. Because there is this uncertainty, and access to U.S.
securities markets is important to both the U.S. and world
economies, this issue should be discussed in further negotiation
rounds.
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